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"AN ANOMALY UNKNOWN:" SUPREME COURT
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS
ON INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN THE CHEROKEE
CASES (1831-32)

[I] think it very clear that the Constitution neither speaks of them
as states or foreign states, but as just what they were, Indian
tribes; an anomaly unknown to the books that treat of states, and
which the law of nations would regard as nothing more than
wandering hordes, held together only by ties of blood and habit,
and having neither laws or government, beyond what is required
in a savage state.'

L

INTRODUCTION

The early theorists of international law, including Hugo Grotius and
Emmerich de Vattel, attempted to answer the basic question, "How should
nations behave toward one another?" This is a question of ethics. In defining
the "law of nations" they were attempting to formulate an ethical code for
nations. Given the fact that the language they used conceived of the state as a
person (according to Grotius, "a perfect body of free men;, 2 for Vattel, "a
moral person"3) the most obvious and logical approach was to transfer the
ethical principles that controlled on the individual level to states. If the state is
a "superperson," then the law of nations is ethics in macrocosm.4 In developing

t. Justice Johnson in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5Pet.) 1, 27 (1831).
2. HuGo GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 25 (Hyperion 1979) (1625).
3. EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 49 (T. & J.W. Johnson 1859) (1758) (This source is
an edited work and therefore the page numbers correspond to the pagination of the present editor, not the
original author).
4. "The 17th-century theories of international law grounded their principles upon the power of reason,
morality, and natural law ....The Grotian vision of world order assumed the legitimacy of the emerging

TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.

[Vol. 1:339

their theories, these writers alternate between two methods of proof, logic and
reference to authority, which are upon close examination, analytically imprecise
and incompatible.

A. Logic
Trying to construct a logical diagram of their arguments is like trying to
debone a jellyfish. The reasoning employed is weak and self-referential,
ultimately producing the axiom: This is the way it is, so this is the way it should
be. Cloaked in the language of objectivity, faulty induction masquerades as
scientific analysis. However unintentional, the reasoning is circular and selffulfilling. Similar analyses will arise in our examination of the Cherokee Cases.

B. Authority
The other approach is blanket reference to authority. Evidence that a theory
of how people or nations should behave toward one another is correct comes
either from "experience ' 5 or "nature ' '6 (the Enlightenment replacement for
Grotius frequently bolsters his conclusions with the
divine authority).
seventeenth century forerunner of the string cite.7 Either way, we are enclosed
within a bubble of cultural subjectivity from which, inevitably, flow unfortunate
consequences for those standing without.

society of independent states and kingdoms. The hope was that the field of international relations could be
regulated by universal principles." Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr., The Grotian Vision of World Order, 76 AM. J.
INT'L L. 477, 492 (1982). This article traces the emerging concept of international relations from the 14th to
the 17th centuries. For additional historical perspective, see also F.S. Ruddy, International Law and the
Enlightenment: Vattel and the 18th Century, 3 INT'L LAW. 839 (1938).
5. For example, "Man is so formed by nature, that he cannot supply all his own wants, but necessarily
stands in need of the intercourse and assistance of his fellow-creatures, whether for his immediate preservation,
or for the sake of perfecting his nature, and enjoying such a life as is suitable to a rational being. This is
sufficiently proved by experience." VATrEL, supra note 3, at 55 (emphasis added).
6. "[N]ature has established a perfect equality of rights between independent nations." Id. at 232. "As
these rules are founded on right reason, and are consequently approved and prescribed by the law of nature,
every man, every sovereign, is obliged to admit and follow them." Id. at 345.
7. 'Thus, for instance, to deprive another of what belongs to him, merely for one's own advantage, is
repugnant to the law of nature, as Cicero observes in the fifth Chapter of his third book of offices; and, by way
of proof, he says that, if the practice were general, all society and intercourse among men must be overturned.
Florentinus, the Lawyer, maintains that it is impious for one man to form designs against another, as nature
has established a degree of kindred amongst us. On this subject, Seneca remarks..." GROTIUS, supra note 2,
at 18, 19.
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II. GROTIUS AND VATTEL

A. Backdrop of Modern Ethics
Grotius and Vattel both define the "law of nations" as the "law of nature
applied to nations." 8 A brief historical excursion into the "law of nature" is
necessary in order to understand how this concept was imported into the law of
nations and consequently applied, misapplied, or not applied at all in the
Cherokee cases. This requires an examination of Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan,
the cornerstone of modem western ethical theory. Although it was published in
1651, twenty-six years after Grotius's Rights of War and Peace and a century
before Vattel's Law of Nations, it is a useful touchstone, a vantage point from
which to look back at the one and forward to the other.
Hobbes (1588-1679) wrote at a time when society was becoming
industrialized and secular. He was greatly influenced by Galileo, the founder of
natural science. 9 It was Galileo who first developed the idea, axiomatic for us
today, that observation and experiment are the principal criteria for scientific
truth; that science is grounded in empiricism, not authority.
Hobbes attempted to place ethics on a scientific basis. He sought ethical
standards not in religious authority but in human nature itself. For the early
modern world, this was a seismic shift in ethical thinking; as a consequence, it
was imperative to anchor morals in human nature. Once divine authority has
been thrown out, there is no reason antecedent to the imposition of civil law why
people or nations should behave benevolently toward one another. Morality
must be grounded in the principles of human psychology, with the creation of
human law flowing from it as a natural consequence. This is the motive force
behind Hobbes' theory.
According to Hobbes, in the state of nature, prior to the creation of society,
we are not rational but appetitive.1 t Natural appetite is the irrational striving
after infinite power, which we seek because (unlike other animals) we can
foresee future need." In the state of nature no duties exist, only rights. The
paramount human goal (the summum bonum, the greatest good) is selfpreservation, and the right of nature is to take anything necessary for selfpreservation. 2 But exercising this natural right inevitably brings us into
conflict with others as we fight over the finite supply of nuts and berries in
Hobbes's primitive state. This struggle creates a paradox: by exercising our
natural right, we run the risk of self-destruction. The dawn of reason resolves
this paradox. As we fulfill our natural appetites we come into combat with
others. Locked in this mortal combat, the fear of violent death (the summum

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

GROTUS, supra note 2, at 25; VATrEL, supra note 3, at 53.
RICHARD TUCK, HOBBES, 50, 104 (1989).
See generally FROM DESCARTES TO LOCKE 177-82 (T.V.Smith & Maijorie Grene eds., 1974).
Id. at 187.
Id. at 192-93.
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malum, greatest evil) leads us to "natural reason." 3 This is the stage in which,
although still residing in the state of nature, we become cognizant of the natural
law: avoidance of self-destruction. 4
Once aware of this natural law, however, we are powerless to fulfill it (to
avoid self-destruction) while still in the state of nature. Our newly-attained
reason, however, bridges the gap. It leads us to join together and create the
Leviathan: an artificial man, a mortal god, a sovereign, a mutual covenant
between reasonable people who give up a portion of their individual rights in
order to guarantee individual security. 5 The concept of a faculty of "natural
reason" and its function as a stepping stone are important elements in Hobbes's
illustration of humankind's "upward progress" toward civilization. In humanity's
primitive state, the "pure" state of nature, individuals do not substantially possess
reason; nevertheless, reason of some sort (a kind of quasi-rational state) enters
into human interaction before the establishment of society and civil law. Thus
moral obligation exists in the state of nature and the Leviathan is created by the
will of the people, not the decree of God; civil society is established on a secular
basis.
Once we are imbued with "natural reason" we have entered a transitional
state between primitive society, where we are fueled solely by our appetites and
passions, and "civilized" society, where we are ruled by reason. This concept
of a civilized society springing from the capacity to reason, and valuing
individual rights and individual property ownership, shuts cultures not so
organized out of the loop. It defines their peoples as irrational, primitive, and
of lesser value. From such a world view emerges a bias against cultures with
a more nomadic or more community-oriented social structure. Such bias is
apparent in the writings of Grotius and Vattel and is echoed in the Cherokee
Cases.

B. Grotius
Hobbes' attempt to distill fundamental scientific principles out of nature is
somewhat foreshadowed in Grotius's Rights of War and Peace. Grotius (15831645) introduces a skeptical element into his ethical theory, and his frame of
reference includes the concept of a state of nature in which all people exist,
possessed of natural rights, including that of self-preservation. 6

13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 192.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 203.
TUCK, supra note 9, at 21.
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1. Natural Law
Grotius begins his analysis with rational society, that is, society "established
among rational creatures,"' 17 not primitive society. Right is given a negative
definition: "that which is not unjust."' 8 Grotius further states: "[A]nything is
unjust, which is repugnant to the nature of society."'" The concepts of right
and justice are equated, and then (despite the apparent objectivity of the
language) defined through the cultural self-reference of common consensus.
From this follows the principle of self-preservation. He paraphrases Seneca:
[A]ll the members of the human body agree among themselves,
because the preservation of each conduces to the welfare of the whole,
so men should forbear from mutual injuries, as they were born for
society, which cannot subsist unless all the parts of it are defended by
mutual forbearance and good will.'
This is the utilitarian golden rule, Hobbes law of nature
(although Hobbes would
2
probably disagree that we are "born for society"). '
While Grotius attempts to be scientific, he retains a religious slant. This
makes his arguments confusing. In certain places he appears to equate natural
law with divine law and to interchange "natural right" and "natural law" as
though they were synonymous. Natural law seems to be the operation of
instinct; yet, human law sets rules about concepts such as property, which did
not exist in the state of nature. But underlying human law is the ultimate
bedrock: divine law, the Ten Commandments. Natural right seems to be moral
Yet Grotius
conscience, inherently and infallibly implanted in us by the divine.
22
defines it in Hobbesian terms as the "dictate of right reason.,
Despite the confusion, Grotius can still be considered as secularizing the
natural law concepts. In the sixteenth century, these concepts were taken
(religious underpinnings intact) into the consideration of indigenous peoples in
the nascent framework of international law. Francisco de Vitoria, for example,
used natural law concepts to criticize Spain's use of papal bulls to legitimize
land claims in the New World ( new to Europe, perhaps, but already inhabited
and thus not terra nullius) 3 In his 1532 lectures De India and De Jure Belli
he argued that according to the dictates of natural law Native Americans were

17.
18.
19.
20.

GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.

21. "In Grotian and post-Grotian thought, law was grounded upon human sociability." Murphy, supra note
4, at 492. This is one of Grotius's most significant departures from Hobbes.
22. Id.
23. Spain and Portugal drew upon the authority of the Church to support their claims because Roman law
allowed for legitimate conquest and occupation of uninhabited territory only. Sharon Lynn O'Brien, The
Application of International Law to the Legal Status of Native Americans 13 (1978) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Oregon).
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the true owners of their lands, and a foreign nation could not claim title through
discovery alone.24 But natural law also dictated that indigenous peoples allow
foreigners free travel, the right to trade, and proselytization efforts. Refusal
would set the stage for a "just war," whereby the foreign nation if victorious
could legitimately take title to the conquered lands.25 Vitoria was the first to
include indigenous peoples under the rubric of international law. By placing
Christian and non-Christian on a plane of equality, Grotius set the stage for true
recognition of the sovereignty of indigenous peoples (their right to own and
control their own lands and negotiate treaties on a level with other more
recognized and established foreign states).26 Analysis of the Cherokee cases
reveals that this recognition is arguably superficial. In this regard it is
worthwhile noting S. James Anaya's comment that:
[t]heorists eventually modified the law of nations to reflect, and hence
legitimize, a state of affairs that consisted in the subjugation of
indigenous peoples. Forgetting the origins of the discipline, theorists
described the law of nations, or international law, as concerning itself
only with the rights and duties of European and similarly "civilized"
states and as having its source entirely in the positive, consensual acts
of those states. Vitoria's admonishments concerning the American
Indians were recast as statements of morality as opposed to law,
international law moved to embrace what the "civilized" states had
done, and what they had done was to invade foreign lands and peoples
and assert sovereignty over them.27
2. Definition and attributes of sovereignty
Grotius defines the state as "a perfect body of free men, united together in
order to enjoy common rights and advantages. 28 The state derives its authority
from mutual consent. Correspondingly, the law between states derives its
authority from the consent of most other states. The only law in common to
every single nation is the law of nature. 29 The law of nature is a kind of
common law between nations. 30
The three main powers of a state are the right to make its own laws, the
right to execute them in its own manner, and the right to appoint its own
magistrates.3 1 A sovereign power cannot be under the control of any other

24. Id. at 14.
25. S. James Anaya, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and International Law in Historical and
Contemporary Perspective, 1989 HARV. INDIAN L. SYMP. 191, 195 (1990).
26. Id. at 195-97.
27. S.James Anaya, Indigenous Rights Norms in Contemporary InternationalLaw, 8 ARIZ. J. INT'L. &
COMP. L. 1, 3 (1991). See also GROTIUS, supra note 2 at 112.
28.
29.

GROTIUS, supra note 2, at 25.

Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 60-61.
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power, and its actions cannot be annulled by anyone.32 Therefore a state in
subjugation to another state is not sovereign. Confederated states, however, still
retain their individual sovereignty.33
3. Possession of unoccupied lands
Uninterrupted possession of "desert" lands cannot create express title. Such
a right is the creation of civil law. Each state's civil law applies only within its
own borders and cannot apply between two countries. So, as between two
sovereign nations, boundaries are settled by treaty.'
To disturb anyone in the actual possession of territory is "repugnant to the
general feelings of mankind. '35 However, an owner's silence may be taken by
another party as a valid presumption that property is deserted if the owner's
silence is of his own free will and with knowledge of the other party's claim.36
This presumption is valid because it is improbable that anyone would allow
another to take one's property without objecting.
This presumption has
actually become a rule between nations, since they have subscribed to it for
mutual convenience.38
4. Treaties and Treaty Interpretation
The roots of the theories of treaty interpretation merit close attention, since
the various arguments in the Cherokee Cases rest heavily upon treaty interpretation.39 Grotius divides treaties into two types: those based on the law of
nature, and those based on man-made obligations. 4° Why do we need treaties
based on the law of nature? Grotius regretfully remarks that before the Biblical
flood, natural justice reigned on the earth, but after the flood, evil took hold,"
32.
33.
34.
35.
Cicero.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 62.
Id.
Id at 109-10.
This is supported by a full page of references to "holy writ," Greek and Roman history, Tacitus, and
Id. at 110.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 114.
Id.
Whether or not this is fair is quite another matter; Joseph C. Burke notes that:
filn theory, the Government treated with the tribes as sovereign nations, purchasing only
the lands they chose to sell and guaranteeing forever their title to the lands they chose to
keep. In practice, the constant encroachment of white settlers, which the state governments
would not and the federal government could not prevent, made a mockery of Indian
sovereignty by forcing tribes to sell lands they wanted but could not peacefully keep.
Written treaties that spoke of Indian nations, Indian boundaries, and Indian political rights
remained on file, while time and the lack of records concealed the bribery, threats, and
force that so often preceded their signing. Because the Indians, under pressure, usually
sold the lands that the settlers demanded, the President, the Congress, and the Supreme
Court could maintain the formal position that cession had been voluntary.
Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 501
(1969).
40. GkOTIus, supra note 2, at 168.
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[s]o that one people's robbing and plundering another, even when no war had
been commenced or declared, was deemed lawful."'"
Thus consensual
agreements for mutual forbearance, formerly uncalled for, were rendered
necessary.
Treaties can be made between unequal powers, and treaty obligations
themselves can be equal or unequal. 42 For a superior power, an unequal
obligation is one in which it gives something without getting anything in
return.43 For an inferior power, an unequal obligation is a suppression of
privileges. This may or may not be attended with a diminution of sovereign
power." Just what exactly would lead to a diminution is not spelled out by
Grotius. The only specific example he gives is that of
a conditional surrender
4
which would lead to an entire transfer of sovereignty. '
As to interpretation, words must be construed by their "common acceptation." 46 Ambiguity is resolved by looking at the context. Grotius particularly
points to the consequences of a provision as furnishing an aid to interpretation,
especially where a clause taken in its literal meaning would lead to consequences
foreign or even repugnant to the intention of a treaty.47 That is, ambiguities
must be resolved in a way that will not lead to contradiction or absurdity.

C. Vattel
Emmerich de Vattel (1714-1767) published the Law of Nations in 1758,
thereby becoming "one of the most important and controversial theorists in the
history of international legal thought., 4' The first English translation was made
in 1760 and became an authority in English-speaking countries. It made its way
to the United States in 1775, when a Swiss publisher sent Benjamin Franklin a
new translation.49 Arthur Nussbaum notes that during this time, any information on foreign affairs was eagerly welcomed in the States since, as colonies,
they had been outside of international intercourse. Vattel was cited frequently
in court cases from 1789 to 1820.50 Thompson makes specific reference to
Vattel in his opinion in Cherokee Nation," as does Marshall in Worcester. 2

41.

Id. at 169.

42. Id. at 170.

43. Id. at 171.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 179.
47. Id.

48. Ruddy, supra note 4, at 839.
49. ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 161 (1954).

50. Id. at 162.
51. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.).
52. See infra note 119. Additionally, the influence of Grotius on Justice Marshall is noted by Edward

Dumbauld: "Much of Marshall's learning in the realm of international law was derived from Thomas
Rutherford's Institutes of Natural Law. This digest of Grotius was one of the few law books in Marshall's

library. It was an influential treatise in that era, and Marshall relied extensively on its teachings."

Edward
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1. Natural Law
The basic principle of natural law for Vattel is that "all men inherit from
nature a perfect liberty and independence, of which they cannot be deprived
without their own consent."5 3 A nation is an aggregate of persons, so it is itself
a person-a moral person, possessed of rights and obligations - a society united
Since nations are composed of
to promote mutual safety and advantage.'
persons who before the union are naturally free and independent, living in the
state of nature, then it follows that nations themselves are persons living together
in the state of nature.5 5 Thus Vattel lifts the whole concept of the Leviathan
to the international level.
The law of nations is divided into two areas: the necessary or natural law
of nations56 and the positive law of nations." Natural law is based on the law
of nature, the first principle of which is that "each individual should assist others
when they need it as long as to do so does not harm the individual."5 " This
philosophy is faithful to the Hobbesian ethical framework wherein a person's
first duty is to himself. On the state level it suggests that each nation must do
all it can to help other nations without harming itself.5 9 The second principle
of the natural law of the law of nations is that each nation should be left in
peace to enjoy the freedom with which it has been endowed by nature.'
Flowing from this is the rule that each nation has the right to judge for itself
what its duty is. 6' To Vattel the necessary law of nations is self-justifying.
Because its precepts spring from the law of nature, they are immutable.62
The other branch of the law of nations is positive law or law created by
man. It consists of voluntary law, or the uniform practice of nations, which is
founded on presumed consent; customary law, or custom, founded on tacit
consent; and conventional law, the law of treaties, which is founded on express
consent.63
2. Definition and attributes of sovereignty
For Vattel, self-government is the only criterion for sovereignty.
Sovereignty only requires that a state "govern itself by its own authority and
laws." 64 A weak state that unites itself with a more powerful state, in an

Dumbauld, John Marshall and the Law of Nations, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 38, 40 (1955).
53. VATrEL, supra note 3, at 53.
54. Id.at 52.
55. Id.
56. Id.at 54.
57. Id.at 63.
58. Id.at 56.
59. Id.at 57.
60. Id.
61. Id.at 58.
62. Id.at 55.
63. Id.at 63.
64. Id.at 66.
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unequal alliance, still remains sovereign as long as it governs itself.65 The act
of placing itself under the protection of a stronger state does not divest the state
of its sovereignty.
3. Possession of unoccupied lands
In Book I, Chapter XVIII (Of the Establishmentof a Nation in a Country),
Vattel traces the development of civilization and property rights which at several
points specifically address the situation of the indigenous peoples in North
America.'
God intended the earth to belong to all of mankind, to be their
home and to supply them with food. Thus all men possess a natural right to
inhabit the earth and to derive subsistence from it. In ancient times, cultivation
became necessary because there was no longer enough growing wild to satisfy
everyone's wants. Consequently, people could no longer be nomadic and
possess all land in common. They had to establish themselves in particular
places and take over particular lands so that they could cultivate enough for
themselves without being disturbed. This is the origin of property rights. 67
Since all of mankind has an equal right to things that have not yet fallen
into the possession of anyone, and those things belong to the first claimant,
nations may take possession of uninhabited countries. Simply claiming title by
planting a flag or making a declaration is not enough. The nation must actually
possess and use the "uninhabited" lands. The earth belongs to all people as a
means of sustenance; therefore, no nation may appropriate more land than it can
settle and cultivate.
It follows from this, Vattel maintains, that the Indian tribes in the new
world cannot be said to truly possess the "immense regions" in which they live,
so it is appropriately in conformance with nature to limit them to smaller
territory. 68 Again iin Book II, Chapter VII, he reiterates that while nomadic
peoples do possess the land over which they wander, other nations may move in
and settle on parts of it without injustice. 6' There is no injustice in this as long
as there is enough space for all to supply their wants. If the newcomers teach
the indigenous tribes to raise food through cultivation, then, since cultivation
provides greater yield in less space, they can move in and settle on the land, free
of any pangs of moral compunction. This is only justifiable, however, in cases
of "necessity," a term which Vattel does not venture to define.70

65. Id.
66. Id. at 172.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 175. Vattel has words of praise for the Puritans, who, though they had a charter to the land they
settled, nevertheless also made the gesture of purchasing it from the Indians.
69. "The savages of North America had no right to appropriate all that vast continent to themselves;...
If the pastoral Arabs would carefully cultivate the soil, a less space might be sufficient for them." Id. at 259.
70.

Id.

349
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4. Treaties and treaty interpretation
Equal treaties embody equivalent
Treaties are equal or unequal. 7'
promises.7 2 Unequal treaties are those in which nations do not exchange
reciprocal or equivalent promises.7 3 These treaties do not necessarily impair

sovereignty if the weaker party is merely consenting to a restriction. 4
However, the treaties do impair sovereignty if the weaker party agrees to refrain
from a certain action. An example would be declaring war against a particular
country without the consent of the stronger party.7 5 Such an action would
constitute a surrender of free will, one of the most important characteristics of
a sovereign state.
Regarding treaty interpretation, Vattel tracks Grotius: language should be
used in its common sense;" provisions should be given the meaning attached
to them at the time of making by the parties; 77 ambiguities should be determined in context. 78 The consequences of an ambiguous provision must be
examined in order to determine its meaning:
It is not to be presumed that sensible persons, in treating together, or
transacting any other serious business, meant that the results of their
proceedings should prove a mere nullity. The interpretation, therefore,
which would render a treaty null and inefficient, cannot be admitted.
We may consider this rule as a branch of the preceding; for, it is a
kind of absurdity to suppose that the very terms of a deed should
reduce it to mean nothing. It ought to be interpreted in such a manner
as that it may have its effect, and not prove vain and nugatory ..

II.

.

THE CHEROKEE CASES

A. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
On December 19, 1829, Georgia passed an act adding Cherokee Territory
the
state and extending jurisdiction over it, declaring Cherokee law null and
to
void. The Cherokee Nation sought an injunction against the state of Georgia and
all its officers and agents from executing and enforcing the laws of Georgia

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 293.
Id.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 297.

75.

Id.

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

347.
345.
352.
352-53 (emphasis omitted).
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within Cherokee Territory. The narrow issue before the Supreme Court was
whether the Cherokee Nation constituted a foreign state for purposes of Article
III standing. The Court ruled against the tribe, denying the injunction on the
grounds that the Cherokee Nation, while a state, was not a foreign state within
the meaning of the Constitution and thus did not have standing. The Indian
tribes were not foreign states but rather "domestic dependent nations. ' 80
1. Marshall's opinion
In six concise pages Marshall gives two main reasons for concluding that
the Indians are not foreign states for constitutional purposes. The first reason is
that the Indians' imperfect land tenure denies them an important attribute of
sovereignty: absolute dominion over their lands.8" While the Indians have an
undisputed right to occupy their lands, the United States possesses a title
independently of their will which will in time become paramount.82 So, despite
the fact that their land right, such as it is, is unquestioned, the Indians live within
the greater embrace of a larger power and are subject to it.
The second reason is international consensus. Since other nations view the
United States as having sovereignty over the Indians, the government does have
sovereignty over the Indians. 3 This repeats the circular argument: this is the
way it is, so this is the way it should be. In Vattel's scheme, this would fall
under the positive law category of customary law, which is founded on the tacit
consent of all but the Native American tribes.
The only document Marshall draws upon to bolster his conclusion is the
Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution." By referring separately to
foreign nations and Indian tribes, he maintains, the clause differentiates between
them. This reference may be appropriate, since the Court is trying to determine
whether the tribes are states within the meaning of the Constitution, but it is also
as self-referential as the justification of international consensus outlined above.8"

80. Id. at 17
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 17-18.
84. Id. at 18.
85. O'Brien maintains that "[a] final point concerning Marshall's reliance on the commerce clause
involves the propriety of using domestic law to decide a question of international law. The weakness of this
approach was apparently well understood by the Chief Justice. At no point in the Cherokee Nation decision
did Marshall state the Cherokees were not a sovereign state under international law. Instead, Marshall very
carefully defines the Cherokees as not being a foreign state within the meaning of the Constitution." O'Brien,
supra note 23, at 56. The existence of the Nation's Article In standing to sue was, however, the narrow issue
before the court.
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2. Johnson's opinion
Justice Johnson's opinion is much harsher: Indian nations do not qualify as
states because they are not civilized. 6 He calls upon Vattel's customary law
when he further asserts that tribes are not sovereign because they have never
been recognized as such under international law.' The doctrine of discovery,
he claims, gives absolute dominion to the discoverers.8" The conditional
language of the Treaty of Hopewell (1785) is "certainly the language of
sovereigns and conquerors, and not the address of equals to equals;"8 9 it effects
a complete relinquishment of sovereignty. The provisions of Article IX,
including those in which the Cherokees place themselves under the sole and
exclusive protection of the United States and give the United States the exclusive
right to regulate trade "amount ... in terms to a relinquishment of all power,
legislative, executive, and judicial to the United States." 9 This is contrary to
the principles outlined by Grotius and Vattel, which hold that treaties can be
made between unequal powers, and that such compacts do not automatically strip
the "weaker" state of its sovereignty.9t
Johnson maintains that the nature of the Indian's land right is essentially
temporary. Originally the government intended to help them "progress" from
hunter-gatherers to the more civilized agricultural state in order to incorporate
them into Anglo-American culture, but this was "a policy which their inveterate
habits and deep-seated enmity has altogether baffled., 92 Thus, their occupation
of the land was meant only to last until they exhausted the game and moved out
of the territory (at which point the United States' ultimate sovereign right over
the land would be perfected).93
What Johnson is in essence saying is that the Indians' obstinate refusal to
adhere to modem Western European theories of human social progress (from
chaotic and primitive to civilized and rational state)94 devalues them as humans,
thereby justifying a dismissal of their rights. This is another example of the
circular logic and cultural self-reference apparent in international law theory from
its earliest beginnings:95 This is the way it is, so this is the way it should
be-and anything that is not this way does not count at all. Only in this context

86. "I cannot but think that there are strong reasons for doubting the applicability of the epithet state, to
a people so low in the grade of organized society as our Indian tribes most generally are." Cherokee Nation,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 21.

87. Id. at 22.
88. Id. at 23.
89. Id.
90.

Id. at 24-25. Justice Johnson blithely reasons further that since the treaty did not treat the Indians as

sovereign and nothing after that served to grant them sovereign status, they are not sovereigns. Id. at 25.
91. See discussion supra parts II.B.4, II.C.3.
92. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 24.
93. Id.
94. See discussion supra part II.A.
95. See discussion supra part I.
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can we even partially grasp Johnson's inability or unwillingness to consider the
Indians as anything other than "an anomaly unknown."
Johnson holds that the inability to control their own lands is an automatic
negation of sovereign status for the Cherokees. 97 This emphasis on dominion
over lands as the ultimate and sole criterion of sovereignty, also mentioned in
Marshall's opinion, does not coincide with the theories of either Grotius or
Vattel. As noted above, both theorists focus on government in their definitions
of a state; for Grotius, a sovereign state is one which makes and executes its own
laws and appoints its own magistrates; 98 for Vattel, one which "govern(s) itself
by its own authority and laws."9 9 Nothing could more completely reveal
Johnson's inherent cultural bias than this fundamental inability to consider even
the possibility that self-government could be compatible with lack of full
territorial control.
3. Baldwin's opinion
Justice Baldwin's opinion introduces two new points. First, the Cherokee
Nation is not a foreign state because the executive branch has never considered
it as such; the fact that the Department of Indian Affairs was established
separately from that of foreign affairs is conclusive proof."°° This distinction
is therefore a political matter, completely outside the scope of the Court.''
Secondly, Indian sovereignty would contravene the principle behind the
Equal Footing Doctrine. 0 2 New states could not possibly enter the union on
equal footing with existing states if they were deprived of sovereignty and
jurisdiction over portions of their territory. Both these arguments are selfreferential.
Baldwin then launches into an analysis of the Treaty of Hopewell which
reiterates Johnson's main points. The treaty is not between equals: in it the
Cherokees acknowledge their dependent character, hold their lands only as an
"allotment" of "hunting grounds," and give Congress the exclusive right of
managing their affairs. 103 In Article Twelve, Baldwin claims, the Cherokees
obtain Congressional permission to send a diplomatic agent to Congress,
something, he claims, a sovereign nation would not have to do.' °4 These
provisions turn the treaty into a contractual relinquishment of sovereignty, and
having executed such a relinquishment the Cherokees cannot then attempt to

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 27.
Id. at 27.
See discussion supra part II.B.I.
See supra part II.C.I.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 33.

101,

Id.

102. Id. at 35.
103. Id. at 38. 'There can be no dependence so anti-national, or so utterly subversive of national existence
as transferring to a foreign government the regulation of its trade, and the management of all their affairs at
their pleasure." Id. at 39.
104. "That the Indians may have full confidence in the justice of the United States respecting their interests,
they should have the right to send a deputy of their choice whenever they think fit to Congress." Id. at 38.
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claim entry to the courts as a foreign sovereign. But a treaty between two
nations, in which one gives up its sovereignty, can no longer be a treaty between
two nations. Nowhere in the Treaty of Hopewell do the Cherokees expressly
relinquish sovereignty. Interpretations of the various provisions as indirectly
relinquishing sovereignty ought to be reexamined in light of both Grotius's and
Vattel's abjurations that ambiguous provisions must be interpreted in context,
and in light of their consequences. Interpretations which result in absurdities or
contradictions should not be admitted since they essentially nullify the treaty.,15
4. Thompson's dissent
Thompson's opinion is framed squarely within the principles of Vattel. A
state is "a body of men, united together, to procure their mutual safety and
advantage by means of their union."' 6 Any such state which governs itself
is sovereign, regardless of whether it has formed an unequal alliance with
another state: "a weak state that, in order to provide for its safety, places itself
under the protection of a more powerful one, without stripping itself of the right
of government and sovereignty, does not cease on this account to be placed
among the sovereigns who acknowledge no other power."' 7 He further states:
Testing the character and condition of the Cherokee Indians by these
rules, it is not perceived how it is possible to escape the conclusion,
that they form a sovereign state. They have always been dealt with as
such by the government of the United States . . . . They have been
admitted and treated as a people governed solely and exclusively by
their own laws, usages, and customs within their own territory,
claiming and exercising exclusive dominion over the same; yielding up
by treaty, from time to time, portions of their land, but still claiming
absolute sovereignty and self government over what remained
unsold.' O8
He dismisses the fact of the Cherokee's imperfect land tenure as a denial
of sovereignty.1°9 By shifting the emphasis from land dominion to selfgovernment, he recasts the concept of sovereignty as a political, not a territorial
concept. This is more in line with Grotius and Vattel. 10°
As a matter of common sense, Thompson does not understand how the
Cherokees can be treated as sovereign by the government but still not be
considered a foreign state within the meaning of the Constitution.11' He

105. See supra parts Il.B.4, II.C.3.
106. Cherokee Nations, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 52.
107. Id. at 53.
108.

Id.

109. Id. at 55.
110.
111.

See supra part ILI.A.2. and part II.C.1.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 54.

TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.

[Vol. 1:339

reverses Johnson's circular reasoning:
the Cherokees were here before we
were and were not connected to any other power, therefore they were foreign
nations as over against every other country in the world. Nothing
can be found
3
to revoke that status, therefore they remain foreign nations."
In his treaty analyses, Thompson looks at the same provisions and comes
to the opposite conclusions as Johnson and Baldwin. For example, he
characterizes the "deputy to Congress" provision of Article Twelve of the Treaty
of Hopewell as "a full recognition of the sovereign and individual character of
the Cherokee Nation."' 14 And he points to other provisions which support
sovereignty: those which stipulate the restoration of prisoners taken by either
side; those which draw a boundary line between the Cherokees and the United
States which includes territory within the physical limits of Georgia; and those
which stipulate that the Cherokees will turn over criminals to the United States
who have taken refuge in their territory."1 5
What more explicit recognition of the sovereignty and independence
of this nation could have been made? It was a direct acknowledgement, that this territory was under a foreign jurisdiction . ... The
necessity for the stipulation must be, because the process of one
government and jurisdiction will not run into that of another; and
separate and distinct jurisdiction, as has been shown, is what makes
governments and nations foreign to each other in their political
relations." 6
He also dismisses the issue of the Indian Commerce Clause as a "mere
verbal criticism. '' .. The clause was intended merely for commercial regulation. Here, unlike the other justices, he is interpreting the clause in context, and
to avoid "absurdity," as both Grotius and Vattel would do.tt The fact that the
Constitution leaves this power in the hands of the federal and not state
government is further proof that the Constitution considers the Indians tribes as
separate jurisdictions, distinct from states." 9
Finally, Thompson regards a treaty as a contract. If the Indians were
considered competent to enter into contracts, it would be inconsistent to deny
them the ability to enforce them.' 20 This follows Grotius's and Vattel's treaty
interpretation principles. Since "[t]he Constitution expressly gives the court
jurisdiction in all cases of law and equity arising under treaties with the United

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See discussion supra 1I.A.2. and note 91.
Cherokee Nation 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 55.
Id. at 66.
Id. at 61.
Id.
Id. at 62.
See supra part IHI.A.3., II.B.4., and ll.C.3.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 64.
Id. at 59.
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States," 12' and Georgia has violated the treaty, the Supreme Court ought to
hear the case.'22

B. Worcester v. Georgia
On December 22, 1830, Georgia passed another act prohibiting any white
person from living within Cherokee Territory without a permit from the
government. Worcester and six others were indicted on July 15, 1831, for
violating this act. Worcester argued that the Georgia statute was unconstitutional
on the grounds of repugnance to the treaties between the federal government and
the Cherokee Nation, still in force, which acknowledged the Territory as free of
legislative interference by the states.' 23 The Constitution gave regulation of
intercourse with the Indians exclusively to the federal government; the state of
Georgia, Worcester claimed, was unlawfully interfering with this. 24 The
Supreme Court agreed, holding that exclusive authority to deal with the tribes
lies with the federal government; though the Cherokee Nation is not foreign, it
is still a nation, and sovereign within the domestic arena." 2 The Constitution
will brook no state interference with the tribes.
In this case Marshall's opinion is a more thorough forty-one pages (as
opposed to six in Cherokee Nation) which includes a treaty analysis along the
lines of Thompson-that is, adhering more closely to the law of nations as laid
out by Grotius and Vattel. First, he corrects Johnson's misinterpretation of the
doctrine of discovery; it did not grant absolute sovereignty over the land, but
merely gave the discovering nation the exclusive right to purchase lands from the
natives as against all other nations. 126 This is an agreement among the
European powers in order to avoid conflict, that is, a principle of customary
law.127

Marshall then moves on to treaty analysis. He discusses three treaties: the
first Treaty with the Delawares (1778), the Treaty of Hopewell, and the Treaty
of Holston (1791). The first Delaware treaty "in its language, in its provisions,
is formed as near as may be, on the mould of treaties between the crowned heads
of Europe."' 28 He stresses the29language of equality, and the fact that trade is
regulated in an equal manner.
Moving to the Treaty of Hopewell, Marshall addresses the troublesome
provision in the Third Article by which the Cherokees place themselves under

121. Id.
122. Id.

123. Id. at 530.
124. Id. at 531.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at
Id. at
Id at
Id. at
Id.

561.
544.
543.
550.
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the protection of the United States. 30 Adopting the reasoning of Thompson
(and Vattel), he maintains that this does not constitute a relinquishment of
131
sovereignty: "Protection does not imply destruction of the protected."
He dismisses Johnson's and Baldwin's dissective analysis of specific treaty
language as cavil. The Indians did not understand terms such as "allotted" and
"hunting grounds" exactly as the United States did. These terms ought to be
interpreted as the Native Americans would have understood them. 32 This is
the genesis of the "canons of construction," in which Marshall is faithful to the
principles of Grotius and Vattel: words should be used in their "common
acceptation,"' 133 and provisions should be given the meaning attached to them
at the time of making by the parties. 134 Similarly, he examines the "managing
their affairs" clause of Article IX in its context. His conclusion is that it has
only to do with trade, and cannot not be interpreted as an intentional divestment
by the Indians of their full sovereignty; this would go against the whole spirit of
the treaty. 135 Marshall then goes through the provisions of the treaty of
Holston, many of which are36repetitions of those in the Treaty of Hopewell, and
stresses their equal nature.
By virtue of the fact that these treaties were made, and were adopted and
sanctioned by the Constitution along with the treaties of all other nations, the
tribes are placed on the same plane with those other nations.137 The fact of
these repeated treaties is itself proof of the Indians' right to self-government.
The settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does
not surrender its independence-its right to self-government, by
associating with a stronger, and taking its protection. A weak state, in
order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the protection of
one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of government,
and ceasing to be a state . . . . 'Tributary and feudatory states,' says
Vattel, 'do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states,
so long as self-government ...[is] left in the administration of the
state.' 138
In his opinion in Worcester, Marshall decisively lifts tribal status beyond the
sphere not just of state jurisdiction but state interference. By discarding the
emphasis on dominion over land and underlining self-government as the primary
criterion for sovereign status, Marshall adheres in this second case more closely
to the principles of international law laid down by Grotius and Vattel and
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132.
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134.
135.
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Id. at 551.
Id. at 552.
Id. at 552-53.
See discussion supra part II.B.4.
See discussion supra part II.C.3.
Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 554.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 560-61.
Id.
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prevents the further erosion of tribal rights by state encroachment which could
easily have followed from the first Cherokee case.

IV

CONCLUSION

The law of nations began as an ethical code for nations. It set up standards
for the mutual conduct of states, those larger bodies composed of individuals
united together by common consent for the common good. Many of the ethical
principles devised for the conduct of international relations are contradictory and
self-serving when applied to non-European "uncivilized" peoples. They exhibit
tension between moral conscience and a Eurocentric superior prerogative.
Language of apparent objectivity and equality (not always sincere, sometimes
patronizing) wars with self-interest evident in doctrines justifying the prevailing
power structure. For example, following the seventeenth-century rationalist cue,
Grotius secularized the foundations of international law by placing all the earth's
This was
inhabitants-"heathen" or otherwise-on a morally equal plane.'
an indispensable first step toward recognition of the sovereignty of indigenous
peoples. Yet he also countenanced the use of international consensus to
legitimize the imperialistic European practice of claiming title to "unoccupied"
lands (that is, unoccupied by other Europeans)." 4
This tension is also evident in Supreme Court application of these norms to
the indigenous peoples of North America. Robert A. Williams, Jr. has written
of this rationalization of the status quo in reference to Johnson v. McIntosh, the
first case in the Marshall Trilogy (along with the Cherokee Cases it constitutes
the foundation of federal Indian law)The dominant themes of Marshall's denial of Indian natural-law rights
in Johnson are clearly established in those early evasions of judicial
accountability for the positive law established by European-derived
governments for acquiring lands in America. History and the decisions
made and enforced by those Europeans who invaded America
respecting Indian land rights determined the inescapable framework for
Marshall's legal discourse. His judicial task was merely to fill in the
details and rationalize the fictions by which Europeans legitimated the
denial of the Indians' rights in their acquisition of the Indians'
America. 4 '
It was because of this prior agenda that the Supreme Court had to make of the
Cherokee Nation an exception to the rules of international law. If the Indians

139. See discussion supra part H.B.1.
140. See discussion supra part II.C.3.
141. ROBERT A. WILLIAMS,JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WEsTERN LEGAL THOUGHT 312 (1990).
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were measured by the norms of the law of nations regarding sovereignty, the
court would have been forced to draw the inescapable conclusion that they
possessed that status just as other foreign states did, and this would not have
validated the continuing practices of the U.S. government in dealing with the
tribes.
In the second Cherokee case, Marshall still had to rationalize an existing
state of affairs, but he could no longer ignore the ethical dimensions of the
situation. He executed almost a complete about-face, analyzing the question of
sovereignty and the implications of various treaties with the Indians according
to the principles of international law as outlined by Grotius and Vattel. The
result was a holding that the Cherokee Nation was indeed sovereign, but could
only exercise that sovereignty fully within the domestic context. This reinjection of ethics into the law of nations applied to the Indians itself illustrates
how the more powerful nations both formulated and then applied or ignored
these norms according to their own ends and purposes-and through a process
in which, notably, the indigenous peoples themselves had no voice. Circular
logic and cultural self-reference shut them out of it completely. Marshall's
partial rehabilitation of tribal status in Worcester v. Georgia established a quasisovereign status for Native Americans which does in fact make of them an
"anomaly unknown."
Helen W Winston

